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Abstract
Suitable models that auditors can adopt to concurrently audit smart Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDSs) and log analyzers in Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) that 
are also founded on sound empirical claims are scarce. Recently, post-intrusion 
studies on the resilience of the above mechanisms and prevalence of intrusions 
in the above domains have shown that certain intrusions that can reduce the 
performance of smart IDSs can equally overwhelm log analyzers such that both 
mechanisms can gradually dwindle and suddenly stop working. Studies have also 
shown that several components of Cyber Physical Systems have unusual vulner-
abilities. These key issues often increase cyber threats on data security and privacy 
of resources that many users can receive over Internet of a Thing (IoT). Dreadful 
intrusions on physical and computational components of Cyber Physical Systems 
can cause systemic reduction in global economy, quality of digital services and 
continue usage of smart toolkits that should support risk assessments and identifi-
cation of strategies of intruders. Unfortunately, pragmatic studies on how to reduce 
the above problems are grossly inadequate. This chapter uses alerts from Snort and 
C++ programming language to practically explore the above issues and further pro-
poses a feasible model for operators and researchers to lessen the above problems. 
Evaluation with real and synthetic datasets demonstrates that the capabilities and 
resilience of smart Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) to safeguard Cyber Physical 
Systems (CPSs) can be improved given a framework to facilitate audit of smart IDSs 
and log analyzers in Cyberspaces and knowledge of the variability in the lengths 
and components of alerts warned by Smart Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs).
Keywords: intrusion, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), Network Intrusion 
Detection System, smart IDSs, IDS audit, IS auditor, Cyber Physical Systems (CPS)
1. Introduction
Pragmatic studies have recently shown that Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) 
must be adequately protected with security tools to reduce the rising cases of Cyber 
Physical attacks and the destructive impacts of these attacks on global economy, 
international security, digital services and means of livelihood of many ethnic and 
social groups across the globe [1–3]. Further studies have shown that components 
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of Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) possess individual vulnerabilities that can 
endanger continuous usage of Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) [4, 5]. The nature of 
the problems with different kinds of threats and cyber attacks on Cyber Physical 
Systems (CPSs) can correlate to severe disasters and complex confusion that may 
involve different stakeholders. The motives of some intruders may be complex 
to understand if they simultaneously attack the seamless integration of physical 
components and the computational elements of Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) [6]. 
The impacts of some successful cyber attacks in this domain may corrupt or damage 
Cyber Physical data [2, 7]. Some intrusions can leak sensitive information to wider 
audience via social media with the aims to extort and discredit victims and service 
providers of Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) [2].
The complexity and reoccurrence of threats and cyber attacks on the entire 
components of Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) have made many organizations to 
develop the habit of deploying several categories of Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDSs) within the peripherals and gateways of their connections to the entire Cyber 
Physical systems (CPSs) so that these devices can collect and analyze activities that 
signify evidence of intrusions against their corporate networks in real-time [8, 9]. 
Subsequently, analysts can quickly review the reports and respond to the attacks 
before the attacks achieve the objectives of intruders that launch them [10]. These 
issues have inevitably generated several challenges and concerns regarding the 
effectiveness of IDSs and analyzers of logs of IDSs in monitoring complex archi-
tectural systems peculiar to the above domains over the years. Figure 1 illustrates 
Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) that is located in front of a firewall.
In other words, Figure 1 demonstrates one of the two approaches organizations 
can adopt to position Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) in relation to 
firewall within the peripherals and gateways that connect them to the entire Cyber 
Physical Systems (CPSs) [7, 8]. Nevertheless, numerous studies often attest that 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) must always be upgraded to strongly help 
operators control the new dimensions and rising waves of intrusions against cyber 
physical resources across the globe. One of the pragmatic methods to achieve 
this security objective is to make IDSs smarter by connecting them to the Global 
Systems of Mobile (GSM) communication so that the toolkits can always send alerts 
to remote operators such that operators can promptly respond to cyber attacks at 
all time [11]. Thus, smart IDSs are IDSs that are configured such that operators can 
Figure 1. 
NIDSs in front of firewall.
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receive and respond to their alerts through Short Message Services (SMS) to the 
GSM or email addresses of the operators of IDSs in Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs). 
However, there are security and business requirements that underpin the frame-
work upon which smart IDSs reside in private and corporate settings [2, 12]. The 
resilience and capacities of smart IDSs can be improved if operators can combine 
the information they gather from audit of log analyzers with the knowledge of 
the variability of lengths and components of alerts that smart Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDSs) in the networks have generated. This can be used to ultimately 
design and improve the security policy on smart IDSs in the corporate elements of 
Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) [3, 7, 13]. However, empirical studies on smart IDSs 
that specifically focus on audit of smart IDSs and log analyzers are inadequate over 
the years.
Basically, empirical studies on smart IDSs in the context of Cyber Physical 
Systems (CPSs) involve pragmatic examinations of specific experiments conducted 
with smart IDSs to concurrently correct security concerns and audit issues. These 
procedures can assist operators to improve the detection of intrusions against Cyber 
Physical Systems (CPSs) and cloud resources at large. The argument underpinning 
this chapter is that logs of smart IDSs should be concurrently audited during IDS 
audit. Otherwise, they may not be very useful for post-intrusion reviews. Similarly, 
lack of audit of logs of smart IDSs may render them ineffective for in-house train-
ing of newly recruited auditors and researchers exploring issues on identification, 
analysis, corroboration and mitigations of threats and security lapses in Cyber 
Physical Systems (CPSs) [5, 8].
Furthermore, smart IDSs are well-known for generating large quantities of alerts 
whenever they are configured to detect possible intrusions against Cyber Physical 
Systems (CPSs) [9, 11, 14]. It is inefficient to manually analyze massive alerts with-
out incurring huge overheads and tradeoffs. Hence, data mining is often recom-
mended as an underlying concept to automate tools that can reduce workload due to 
alerts from smart IDSs [14]. Another central issue here is that some companies use 
the reports obtained from the logs of smart IDSs to augment their networks security 
policies [8, 15, 16]. The necessity to audit smart IDSs alongside with log analyzers 
is not mandatory in the existing models for auditing Information Technology (IT). 
This generic audit framework seems to subsume IDS audit into security policy on 
computers and telecommunications [15, 17]. This weakness may eventually lead 
to lack of segregation of duties among internal auditors, IDS researchers and IDS 
operators. The human elements of the Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) may place 
emphasize on Firewall and other forms of the Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPSs) 
over smart IDSs in the context of the organizational settings in the above settings. 
Moreover, it is plausible that some logs of regular IDSs that were archived might 
be relatively uninteresting details. One of the three central issues here is that the 
IDSs may be configured to send raw alerts to the mobile devices of the operators 
to analyze. This means that certain log analyzers that can analyze short messages 
must be installed in the Mobile phones of the operators of smart IDSs. Alternatively, 
remote log analyzers can send short text messages that indicate processed alerts of 
smart IDSs to the operators. Whichever the case, it is imperative to also audit pro-
grams that analyze logs of smart IDSs in Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) to regularly 
establish the degree of information inherent in the archived logs at each time and to 
ascertain the patterns of packets intended to overload smart IDSs at certain period 
of time in the above settings [8].
Findings suggest that suitable realistic datasets that can be used to concurrently 
audit smart IDSs and logs analyzers are grossly inadequate for researchers due to 
security issues [17, 18]. Accordingly, the above domain of IDS audit in the security 
of networks and other components of Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) continues to 
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suffer a major setback over the years. Therefore, by using alerts from Snort and C++ 
programming language, this chapter presents a comprehensive review of the above 
research issues and further proposes a feasible model that professionals can adopt to 
lessen the problems. One of the significant contributions of this chapter is its ability 
to practically provide clear review and guidelines that experts and trainees can 
adopt to ensure perimeter defense of mobile and computer networks. The chapter 
uses four datasets to practically illustrate a new framework for concurrent auditing 
of smart IDSs and log analyzers within corporations in the entire Cyber Physical 
Systems (CPSs). Also, the chapter broadly justifies the importance of conducting 
audit of log analyzers in smart phones together with IDSs audit. The remainders of 
this chapter are organized in the following order. Section 2 will present background 
research work that relates to IDS auditing. Section 3 explains the scope of IDS audit 
in Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs). Section 4 discusses challenges confronting 
IDS auditors in auditing Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs). Section 5 provides the 
proposed methodology for auditing smart IDSs and log analyzers while section 6 
concludes the chapter.
2.  Background information on audit of smart IDSs and log analyzers in 
Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs)
Studies have shown that Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) are mergers of collab-
orative networks of automatic systems that are strongly built on sound theoretical 
and scientific principles and seamless integration of many disciplines [1, 6, 12]. 
Some of the disciplines that contribute to progressive growth and modernize Cyber 
Physical Systems (CPSs) over the years include informatics, computer and, mobile 
systems, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), cyberspace, system designs, software, 
process, robotic, automobile and mechanical engineering [1, 6, 12, 19]. The underly-
ing benefit of incorporating integrated components to drive Cyber Physical Systems 
(CPSs) is easy connectivity of many devices and systems to Cyber Physical  
systems (CPSs) across the globe. This capability has resulted into wider applications 
of Cyber Physical Resources (CPRs) in the areas of medical services, agriculture, 
electric installations, space engineering and other notable facets of human  
life [6, 19].
Critical issues begin to surface with the inexhaustible growth currently recorded 
in this domain in recent years especially on the numbers of service users, service 
providers and revenue accrued from sales of products and services that relate to 
Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) [4]. Empirically, experts have argued that security, 
computational efficiencies and degree of helpfulness of complex architectural 
framework that underlying seamless integrations of physical and computation 
components of Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) are serious doubts whenever these 
components are evaluated on the basis of performance, quality of service, users’ 
satisfactions and robustness to counter threats and challenges [5, 20, 21]. Yet, 
emphasis over the years has focused on the computational capabilities of Cyber 
Physical Systems (CPSs) but less attention has been paid to the link between the 
computational and physical elements of this domain [20]. These flaws have raised 
series of technical and research issues on how to forecast traffic flow, optimize 
Mobile Cyber-Physical applications and how to achieve high performances of social 
services and healthcare facilities like wearable devices that run on Internet of a 
Thing (IoT) [1]. The correlations between social settings and industrial applications 
of cloud-based services that interact with Cyber Physical Systems’ designs; innova-
tion and manufacturing of digital resources continue to generate new paradigms 
in manufacturing and design’s settings [6, 22]. These necessitate the importance of 
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measures to bridge the gap between the Cyber physical resources and social setting. 
Collaborative design of embedded systems and various algorithms that experts have 
designed to carry out co-modeling and co-simulation of novel innovations begin to 
emerge. However, majority of these algorithms often exhibit invisible flaws [19].
The above issues coupled with the alarming increase of intrusions against Cyber 
Physical Systems (CPSs) have resulted in the needs for organizations to adopt 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) [8, 10, 20]. These toolkits can then provide 
automated ways to monitor, analyze all incoming and outgoing network packets in 
their corporate networks, trigger and log alerts on suspicious packets they observe 
for security and decision purposes. Nevertheless, most of these mechanisms can 
only detect suspicious packets [9]. They have been criticized for lacking capabili-
ties to make dependable decisions on suspicious activities of users that may signify 
security breach to Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) [23]. Operators must carefully 
review alerts they generate to isolate false positives from realistic attacks. Alerts can 
be daunting and overwhelmingly difficult to manually analyze by operators. Series 
of log analyzers have been proposed over the years to compensate for these weak-
nesses [8, 9]. Studies have shown that significant numbers of log analyzers have 
limited capabilities required to categorize cyber attacks on the basis of all attributes 
of alerts [9]. A few numbers of researches has suggested that, the above devices 
should be upgraded so that they can intimate operators with alerts on real-time 
basis [11, 20]. The rationale is that operators should be able to remotely analyze 
intrusion logs and counter attacks on Cyber Physical Systems without the need to 
physically report to their offices.
These developments have led to the need to audit smart Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDSs) to improve their efficacies. Audit of smart Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDSs) or IDS audit involves comprehensive and thorough examination of 
the networking infrastructure and security controls upon which the management 
and operations of all smart Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) in an organiza-
tion are established [18, 24, 25]. Ordinarily, one of the duties of IDS auditors is to 
thoroughly scrutinize IDSs, establish and report the efficacies of internal controls 
that the organization has implemented to safeguard each detector and resources 
related to these toolkits [26]. The evaluation and the reports of this kind of audit 
can go a long way to determine the level of compliance and operations of all intru-
sion detectors in the company with best global practices. Nonetheless, there are 
numerous challenges with research on audit of smart IDSs in corporate setting in 
the past years [18]. Studies advise that skilled intruders are common threats that 
are extremely disturbing corporate and private users of computer systems in Cyber 
Physical systems (CPSs) [2, 7, 10]. Unfortunately, researchers habitually ignore the 
audit of smart IDSs that should have established exploitable pathways, audit issues 
and novel paradigms on network security and perimeter defense since the inception 
of IDS technology. This neglect has countless impacts on digital resources that con-
nect to cyber physical resources. This shortcoming is explicitly dangerous because it 
is generating warning signals service providers concerning data reliability and qual-
ity of service on local computing resources in many organizations. The impacts of 
some of these security concerns may appear negligible while significant numbers of 
them are grievous and hazardous to corporate existence considering the capabilities 
of demoralizing intrusions recently reported in some public media. Recently, the 
neglect of this aspect of IDS audit and lack of correlation of IDS audit with research 
findings have begun to subject sequence of findings from logs analyzers, integrity 
and compliance with professional standards and regulatory authorities to series of 
contentions [6, 21, 27].
Importantly, sudden changes in the classifications and dimensions of intru-
sions that often aim to attack computer and mobile services operating within the 
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purview of Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) are global concerns [7, 16]. Intruders 
have acquired more skills such that they can launch packets that have short and long 
datagram to achieve different motives in cyberspace. Studies of many trace files 
suggest instances whereby intruders have split some inbound and outbound packets 
into fragments. Some studies believe that attackers on Cyber Physical systems 
(CPSs) can suddenly varied the intensities of packets to smartly elude detections. 
Numerous audit and networking issues may begin to build up whenever new IDSs 
are installed in the perimeters of digital networks to complement existing IDSs that 
auditors have been previously audited. There are possibility that audit exercises may 
exclude auxiliary issues like log analysis on fragmented packets.
The location of IDSs relative to the firewall in an organization depends on their 
security policy. A growing numbers of opinions affirm that organizations can install 
Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) in the front or back of a firewall for 
different intentions [7, 16]. However, models that auditors can adopt to establish 
suitable approach to organizations are very scarce. Furthermore, current model of 
ICT audit restrict IDS auditors to the physical security, hardware and software com-
ponents of smart IDSs [3, 24]. Auditors must use simulated attacks to investigate 
the initialization, configuration, interface, processing and performances of smart 
IDSs and to ascertain the tendency of the toolkits to dwindle after a prolonged 
usage. They must also evaluate the available disk spaces for both the toolkits and 
mobile devices that receive alerts from IDSs and log analyzers. They must assess 
the contingency plans in the organization to establish business continuity and 
preparedness of the toolkits to resume surveillance after intruders have attacked 
them or after downtime. Auditors must equally evaluate the internal and change 
controls designed to safeguard the smart IDSs from computer viruses and intruders. 
In addition, they will investigate the signatures, alert’s mechanism, policies and 
possible rules that have been updated, their corresponding approvals and authoriz-
ers of the approvals to modify them [24, 25]. Nonetheless, the above procedures 
are flawed in the sense that both the experienced and inexperienced intruders may 
obfuscate and evade smart IDSs audited with the above model. Thus, intrusions on 
cyber components such as sensing, cyber communication mechanisms and physical 
resources like computer hardware, data center, employees and mobile devices that 
the detectors should have discerned and operators would have timely countered 
often achieve intruders’ missions at long run.
One of the fundamental ways this chapter premises for operators and resident 
auditors to lessen the above problems is for both of them to periodically corroborate 
research with audit reports on smart IDSs in the perimeters of the organization. 
However, IDS audit is quite challenging nowadays because it is clearly different 
from the conventional IS audit process [18, 25]. Besides, IDSs audit requires the 
engagement of qualified IS auditors that also possess wide experience and knowl-
edge in the above roles. Suitable IS auditors must also have practical experience on 
the installations of smart IDSs, logs’ analyzers, reporting and countermeasures. 
Moreover, there are acute shortages of operators that also possess auditing skills. 
Besides, standard IDS audit templates and models that can serve as guiding princi-
ples to IDS auditors and operators in corporate environment in the context of Cyber 
Physical Systems (CPSs) are scarce [18, 24, 25]. Consequently, most IDS operators 
ignore the research aspect of their jobs that should be regarded as interim audit and 
concentrate on IDS operations.
Furthermore, approaches that most auditors frequently adopt to conduct IDS 
audit with generic Information System (IS) and audit process often exclude evalu-
ation of the significance of log analyzers in the organization [27]. The dangers 
of the above methods are enormous especially if both reviews are inconclusive, 
unreliable and unsupported by empirical claims before major infringement occurs 
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in the digital networks of the organization. Organizations can experience infringe-
ments in critical and less critical areas of their business operations. Intruders may 
attack resources or areas of corporate systems that attract little or no attention of IT 
managers, inspection and internal control’s managers with the aims to have enough 
time to achieve their objectives and to equally evade detection. Consequently, 
feelers premise that smart IDSs should be strategically installed in the segments that 
will make it difficult for intruders to bypass them. Smart IDSs that are located at 
the hearts of huge inbound or outbound traffic should be thoroughly verified by IS 
auditors from time to time. Traffic that migrates across spanning mode can over-
whelm smart IDSs that are technically weak to compromise.
Generally, research findings and related work in the domains of IDS audit and 
log analyzers are novel issues in network security and Cyber Physical Systems 
(CPSs) [18, 24, 26]. Conventionally, experts have justified the significance of IDS 
policy in the perimeter defense of networks of corporate organizations [8, 13, 27]. 
An empirical study that examined risk-based systems and process audit method 
has been carried out as a strategy to bridge the gap between auditors and architec-
tural designs of IT resources [18]. The model was able to detect the weaknesses of 
the process in terms of risk of material deficiencies and thirteen control patterns. 
However, the research was basically a generalized audit process that has a better 
performance whenever the model is adopted to audit financial data. Moreover, a 
study on how to debug Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) has been 
explored [16]. The proposed model uses detection rules to debug NIDSs and eradi-
cate defective rules that are well-known for triggering repetitive alerts. The model 
can assist IDS operators to reduce workload. However, the major flaw of this model 
is that it has the tendency to be operationally proprietary. The model will require 
routinely extension and upgrade before it can broadly relevant to other categories of 
smart IDSs in the market.
3.  The scope of audit of smart IDSs and log analyzers in Cyber Physical 
Systems (CPSs)
A systematic review of IDS audit is a methodical review or examination of the 
operational conditions of IDSs with the aims to ensure their protection and to 
guarantee efficient, effective and reliable IDS operations within the perimeters 
of computers; cyber physical and sensing resources and mobile networks in an 
organization [13, 25, 28]. The scope of Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) varies from 
organization to organization. Algorithms are the underpinning mechanisms that 
control and regulate collaborative networks of theories, concepts and embedded 
disciplines that constitute Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) in each organization 
[19]. Audit review should reflect components of computer and mobile systems to 
be audited. It should state cloud resources such as networks of computers, mobile 
systems, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), front-end and back-end of the 
networks, software, hardware, human element, work flow and process engineering 
[6]. Audit of smart IDS can be performed in conjunction with or separated from 
the conventional audit exercises in an organization. The audit time table, manage-
ment, misgivings and repeated outbreak of intrusions can influence the necessity 
to conduct IDS audit and its scope of coverage. For Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs), 
the scope of the audit should include the security of sensing processing, storage of 
large alerts, performance of hardware and software and reliability of the systems. It 
should also extend to validation of algorithms, automatic systems, theoretical and 
scientific principles and seamless integration of disciplines underlying the systems 
with best practices. Hence, this type of IDS audit is eventful [14, 18]. Examiners 
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must carefully review and match the security policy of the organization with the 
implementations of smart IDS in the live and test environments to establish areas of 
compliance and noncompliance with best practice. Fundamentally, enterprise must 
have IDS policy. An IDS policy is a standard document stating a plan of actions an 
organization adopts regarding the administration and management of IDSs within 
their digital networks [8]. Besides, IDS policy should state IDS procedures, IDS 
rules and conditions that should be meant before rules can be activated, updated 
or deactivated [13]. The main challenge that IDS auditors often face is that most 
organizations do not have IDS policy [24]. Findings suggest that some companies do 
not isolate IDS policy from their security policies [8]. Hence, rather than separating 
both policies, some of them embedded a few sentences about IDSs in their security 
policies. Consequently, IDS audit and its ancillaries often lack exhaustive reviews 
over the years. Therefore, IDS auditor that wishes to conduct the above IDS audit 
must have well-established knowledge of IDS policy and major components of the 
smart IDSs within the networks.
In Snort for instance, the objectives of the audit must include critical review of 
IDS policy, physical security relating to the IDS (Snort in this case), the hardware 
component and software components of the toolkit. The audit must also include 
packet decoder, preprocessors, detection engine, logging and alerting system and 
output modules [8, 13]. Serious audit issues may arise whenever auditors lack strong 
knowledge of the above components and how they cooperatively work together to 
detect intrusions and to generate output in the required format.
4.  Auditors’ challenges in auditing smart IDSs in Cyber Physical  
Systems (CPSs)
Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) lack the robustness to counter threats, challenges 
and cyber attacks due to weaknesses genetic to individual components that form 
these domains. Hence, there are critical challenges that face auditors and research-
ers of smart IDSs regarding IDS auditing and log analyzers in these domains. This 
section discusses and categorizes some of these issues into two groups; namely, the 
challenges with smart IDSs and challenges with log analyzers.
4.1 Research and audit issues on smart IDSs in Cyber Physical Systems
Different types of smart IDSs keep different categories of logs and alerts in 
different formats. The default settings of parameters that coordinate alerts of smart 
IDSs can enable the toolkits to trigger and log wordy and more explicit warnings 
than the setup that customize these parameters [25, 28]. Figure 2 illustrates one 
Figure 2. 
A sample of alerts from Defcon11 in comma delimited format.
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of the kinds of alerts that Snort can generate. The alerts are in comma delimited 
format because each attribute of an alert is separated by a comma. Operators of 
smart IDSs can implement the formats of alerts they want during implementation 
and before executing IDSs like Snort. The major issue is that the preferred formats 
of alerts cannot be reversed while the toolkits are working. This can create series of 
setbacks if operators if the formats they have implemented do not convey sufficient 
information operators will need to decide on the security matters of Cyber Physical 
Systems in the organization. Figure 2 illustrates alerts that are expressed in comma 
delimited formats.
The alerts contain IP addresses to uniquely identify computers and their domain 
names on the Internet. The alerts are samples of comma delimited alerts extracted 
from Defcon-11 traces. Some of the attributes of the alerts were Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP). However, further information is still required to ascertain attributes 
like the names, of the attacks to understand data transmission and exchange that 
occurred between sources and destinations of various attacks. Figure 3 illustrates 
conventional kinds of alerts that the Snort would log whenever its default parameters 
on logs and alerts are implemented in Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs). This format is 
simple because each alert is explicit to human interpreters. For example, the signature 
generator (Sig_generator) of the first attack in Figure 3, the identification number 
(Sig_id) of the rule that triggered the alert and the number of times the rule has been 
reviewed or updated (Sig_rev) were 125, 1 and 1 respectively [25, 28]. The alerts 
are samples of default alerts extracted from Defcon-10 traces. The attack signified 
telnet’s exploits. In other words, the Intrusion Detection System (Snort) detected 
telnet commands on the FTP command prompt or channel. The attack also indicated 
that someone used a computer with IP address 192.168.2.2 and port 21 to transfer 
file to a computer with IP address of 192.168.2.1 and port 1067 at 10:14 PM on 3rd 
of August. The problem with alerts that are formatted by comma delimiters is that 
auditors would require their documentations to properly understand them because 
they are not constantly explicit. Figure 3 illustrates a sample of alerts of Snort in a 
default format.
It is imperative for the auditor to establish the directory where the alerts and 
systems files of the IDS are kept or recorded in the hardware before the beginning of 
the audit. By default, shows will Snort log alerts to /vary/log/snort/alerts. However, 
the auditor begins to face further challenges if the directory is changed during 
implementation contrary to the conventional or documented standard. Additional 
challenges can occur due to the noncompliance of the organization to both the 
Figure 3. 
A sample of alerts of Snort in a default format.
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recommended disk space and accepted format for alerts in the IDS policy [8, 10]. 
The implication is that it will be difficult to compare the sufficiency of the informa-
tion conveyed in the IDS logs and short text messages that are extracted from differ-
ent segments of the perimeters of the same organization if they have heterogeneous 
formats. In essence, the above sample of the raw alerts explains the link between 
research on smart IDSs and IDS audit.
4.2  Issues with detection rules or policies of smart IDSs in Cyber Physical 
Systems
Practical experience shows that the formats of detection rules vary from 
Intrusion Detection System to another. The rules within the detection engine of 
smart IDSs are many and they are mostly protected by copyright. The rules usually 
instruct smart IDSs to discriminate by logging and raising alerts on specific packets 
that migrate from specific networks into local subnets. Some rules are also designed 
to instruct smart IDSs to indiscriminately log and raise alerts on all suspicious pack-
ets that migrate from any network into local subnets [9]. These rules can also instruct 
the toolkit to always trigger an alert whenever the device observes any TCP packet 
that contains “USER root” in its header [8]. Rules can be localized, designed or 
configure such that they will report suspicious packets heading towards a computer 
in the subnets of Cyber Physical Systems [10]. Several audit issues arise regarding to 
best strategies to audit rules or policies of IDSs. These toolkits have several inbuilt 
rules or policies. There may be some discrepancies between the rules or policies 
that have been implemented in the organization and the security policy driving the 
implementation of rules or policies of the smart IDSs in the system. Discrepancies 
can also occur if some IDSs in the networks are not configured to operate as smart 
toolkits. Professionalism is required in adapting framework for auditing smart IDSs 
to audit IDSs that are not configured as smart toolkits in other to adequately safe-
guard the entire components of cyber physical resources in the organization. One 
of the reasons behind these challenges is that the security policy of the organization 
might not fully reflect the totality of the rules or policies in the detection engines 
of all smart IDSs in the networks. The IS auditor needs to evaluate if the IDS policy 
actually states specific rules or policies that should be activated or deactivated during 
implementations of smart IDSs. It is also necessary for auditors to establish the level 
of compliance of the organization with best security practice on the detection rules 
or policies approved by the management of the organization [8, 24].
New rules or policies can be added to the smart IDSs in other to improve their 
efficacies. However, some rules or policies may generate redundant alerts. Hence, 
it is often difficult to immediately establish the criticality of new and old rules or 
policies without a critical exploration of log analyzers that process alerts that corre-
spond to these rules or policies. Also, session printable policies or rules are difficult 
to recommend for deactivation because they enable the detector to log everything 
attackers have typed [8, 10]. It is possible that all sections of the IDS policy will 
not fully capture the sensitivity of detection rules or policies in organizations. The 
chapter encourages auditors to thoroughly audit available IDS policy to ensure the 
policy is providing suitable standard that covers all components of Cyber Physical 
resources adopted in the organization.
4.3 Issues with maintenance of smart IDSs in Cyber Physical Systems
Smart IDSs must undergo regular maintenance so that they can adequately moni-
tor very high traffic rates migrating into or outside the organization [15, 16, 23]. The 
maintenance of smart IDSs is the process of performing system tuning and routine 
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checks on all smart Intrusion Detection Systems in the organization; the directory 
of each configuration file, logs, text messages; available storage size, available disk 
space, disk space each toolkit has already utilized and the last time each toolkit was 
debugged to establish their readiness to promptly report intrusions that aim to exploit 
features of Cyber Physical Systems that provide opportunities for intruders to cause 
havoc without corrupting Cyber Physical data or leaking sensitive information from 
Cyber Physical Networks. Furthermore, constant maintenance of smart IDSs will 
enable their operators to correct new and past errors that were not recognized during 
the installations, configurations and testing phases of these devices. Usually, cor-
rective maintenance is desirable because it will enable the operators of smart IDSs to 
perfect and improve the operations and performance of smart IDSs [15].
Intruders can compromise the mobile phones and email accounts of operators 
of smart IDSs [11, 21]. Therefore, the above maintenance will equally help opera-
tors of smart IDSs to fine-tune the toolkits so that they can effectively work in new 
environments and whenever the operators replace their mobile devices or renounce 
old email accounts. However, maintenance of smart IDSs requires extra efforts than 
the efforts required to configure and analyze their logs. Hence, most operators of 
smart IDSs often shy away from carrying out IDS porting, corrective and adaptive 
maintenance of these toolkits. From experience, IS auditor can perceive series of 
audit issues whenever the IDS policy does not recognize the significance of mainte-
nance of smart IDSs in the enterprise networks.
4.4 Issues with configurations of smart IDSs in Cyber Physical Systems
There are hardware and software requirements for each smart IDS to exhibit 
performance that will always conform to best security practices. For NIDSs like 
Snort, the toolkit works on operating System like Linux, Windows 2003 Server 
Enterprise Edition and Microsoft Windows XP and hardware like Compaq 1600 
Pentium III with dual Processor Server and Pentium IV workstation.
Using Snort as an example [7, 10], this premises that components such as 
Apache, Pretty Home Page (PHP), WinPcap and Analysis Console for Intrusion 
Databases (ACID) must be audited to ascertain their levels of compliance to best 
industrial practice [28]. The combination of Snort, Apache, database and ACID 
enable the NIDS to log alerts into a database. Two or more toolkits can be config-
ured to centrally log alerts to unified database. Conversely, each toolkit may be 
setup to log its alerts to a different database. The above components also enable 
analysts to visualize and analyze alerts on web interface [8, 10]. Hence, the database 
(back-end) that may be MySQL must also be audited. IS auditors must always refer 
to the IDS policy for guidance. It is a good practice to complement the audit process 
by referring to the security policy of the organization to gain insightful evidence on 
degree of compliance and conformity of both documents.
The dangers are enormous whenever intruders compromise the back-end of 
the toolkit. Intruders can crash the entire toolkit, alter its cryptographic keys and 
render it bad and unintelligent [21]. Subsequently, they can illegally reconfigure the 
smart IDS to log no alerts or to suppress useful alerts [21]. New waves of stealthy 
attacks can shutdown IDSs; enable triggers and disable or re-start the back-end 
databases of the detectors. In the case of Snort, attackers can suddenly shutdown 
the Apache upon which the smart IDS runs. Hence, auditors must establish the level 
of control that safeguards all the components of smart IDSs in the firm. Usually, 
in Snort, Apache’s server uses configuration file that is stored in the /etc/apache2/
apche2.conf [8, 24]. Therefore, auditors must also establish the last date the configu-
ration’s file was updated. Nonetheless, the above ideas are plausible whenever the 
auditors possess the needed skills to critically explore them.
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4.5 Issues with IDS policy and security policy in Cyber Physical Systems
IDS policy is a document that is approved by top management in an organiza-
tion [8]. This document reflects and states how all IDSs in the organization are 
implemented and managed. The document further reveals types of IDSs and their 
versions, configurations, license fees and expiry date and vendors. The document 
defines activities that managements of the organization have agreed to be regarded 
as normal and intrusive activities in their Cyber Physical Systems. It is expected to 
reflect the approved connectivity between log analyzers and logs of smart IDSs. 
It might be uneconomical to send overwhelming alerts directly to the operators of 
smart IDSs. Additionally, some smart IDSs can encrypt the email reports or alerts 
they intend to send to the operators or recipients. However, operators or recipients 
must install suitable tool in their mobile phones or computers to decrypt them. 
Thus, IDS policy should categorically state how the email addresses and mobile 
phones of operators of smart IDSs will receive concise and helpful alerts.
The security policy of an organization is the totality of security mechanisms that 
is approved by top management of the organization. This broad document usu-
ally states how the security’s architecture of the organization should be deployed, 
monitored and managed annually. IDS policy is a segment of security policy. 
Auditors may find it difficult to challenge operators of smart IDSs in an organiza-
tion whereby IDS policy is subsumed in security policy. In addition, the appropri-
ateness of time that the organization must review their IDS policy will be difficult 
to criticize in this circumstance.
Most often, some intruders prefer to launch attacks that can probe or scan cyber 
networks to compensate for their inabilities to have access to the above policy’s 
frameworks [7, 9, 10]. Information System auditors need to assess the security of 
the above policies in the organization to establish how they are kept, the custodian 
of both documents, access and procedures for granting approvals to the employees 
that have the rights to use and rights to know these documents.
4.6 Research and audit issues with log analyzers in Cyber Physical Systems
The quality of information that various log analyzers can derive from differ-
ent formats of alerts that smart IDSs generate depend on many factors. Some 
analyzers of logs that originate from smart IDSs can process specific attributes 
such as Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), Internet Control Message Protocol 
(ICMP), Type of Service (TOS) and Internet Protocol (IP) length. Intruders that 
compromise the TCP and IP of computer networks will distort network conversa-
tions or communications and the exchange of data through application programs 
[10]. The attacks will also affect apps that send packets of data from one computer 
to another. Similarly, the values held in the flags of parameters or attributes of 
alerts also differ from one attribute to another. For instance, log analyzer that 
analysis the parameters of ICMP in Cyber Physical Systems intend to discover 
actions of intruders that have requested for certain details about the systems [29]. 
The intention of the intruder may be to establish computers or mobile devices 
that signify echo reply and destination unreachable. The attack may also reveal 
weaknesses in the configurations of router within Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs). 
The attack can publicize details of routers, timestamp, timestamp reply; redirect 
message headers, domain name request, domain name reply, mobile registration 
request, mobile registration reply, errors in the conversion of datagram; address 
mask request and address mask reply. Intrusions on trace route can provide 
trodden paths for Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in Cyber Physical 
Systems (CPSs) [29].
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In addition, TOS is designed to categorize and prioritize networks’ data so that 
digital devices will process critical data packets before they will process data packets 
that of less significant. However, intruders have many ways they can check the reli-
ability of the networks. Attacks on TOS intend to undermine the quality of services 
rendered by the host and routers in the networks. This category of attacks can 
indiscriminately affect the migrations of different kinds of inbound and outbound 
data within the networks of Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) [2, 7]. Intruders can 
insert fake data into the networks given the knowledge of TOS in the networks. The 
impacts of this attack can be severe if it occurs at the peak of operations whereby 
it coincidentally hinders the priority and migrations of data of higher importance 
than data of less importance in the networks. Moreover, attack on TOS can increase 
the numbers of fragmented packets that lost in transit. It can also cause significant 
delay of packets to complete computer and mobile communications, reassembling 
of fragmented packets and routing of multimedia data.
Each of the above attributes of alerts conveys different meanings to different 
organizations [9]. The mode that every log analyzer adopts to write their results 
into the output files (folders) is very important. Programs that append new records 
with old records would require enough disk space than programs that always clear 
all the content of old records in the output files during execution. For these reasons, 
IDS auditors often face many challenges from company to company in conducting 
thorough investigations on outputs of log analyzers and establish the significance of 
the output files in accordance to best practice.
4.7  Issues with theoretical frameworks for designing log analyzers in Cyber 
Physical Systems
There are several theoretical frameworks that programmers can adopt to 
design log analyzers to analyze logs of smart IDSs within Cyber Physical networks. 
Studies show that Statistical techniques, subjective logic, Visualization, Artificial 
Intelligence (AI), Neural Networks (NNs), Ensemble techniques and data mining 
have been used to design log analyzers in recent years [23]. Some analyzers may 
adopt priority of alerts, similarity of values held in the attributes of alerts, human 
observations, attack scenarios, hierarchical graphs, attacks that overlap, subjec-
tive reasoning and evidence of the damage the attack has caused as underpinning 
philosophies to design log analyzers [23]. Auditors must be thorough in this regards 
because features of non-related attacks may overlap and this will lead to mismatch 
of intrusions [26, 27]. The maximum error of log analyzer will increase if it mis-
matches intrusions. In other words, reports from log analyzer that mismatches 
intrusions are misleading and ineffective to design strong counter measures against 
intrusions in progress.
In addition, it is necessary for auditors to establish how each analyzer select 
minimum similarity and expectation of similarity in other to establish how the 
toolkits merge related alerts together. Also, different algorithms and metrics can 
compute weighted average of related alerts in different ways. Hence, it is challeng-
ing for auditors to be vast in different algorithms for comparing overall similarity of 
the alerts and how various algorithms isolate patterns of alerts that are false posi-
tives from real positives.
4.8 Issues with metrics for designing log analyzers in Cyber Physical Systems
Programmers can design log analyzers that adopt multiple metrics and differ-
ent data mining concepts to analyze logs of smart IDSs [14]. It is easy to compare 
outputs of closely related metrics together. IDS auditors must conduct routine 
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research to ascertain strengths and weaknesses of statistical metrics that program-
mers have used to support intrusion detections in corporate organization that is 
under review. There are different ways to interpret and improve the quality of alerts 
from smart IDSs. Hence, the interface between log analyzer and logs of smart IDSs 
must be reviewed. These will enable auditors to establish suitable metrics for cross-
correlation of alerts rather than interpreting uncorrelated attacks with heuristic 
methods. The instant that the design will update email addresses and mobile phones 
of operators of smart IDSs with new alerts should immediately IDS detects every 
suspicious event. Security issues begin to build up whenever there are networks 
failures such as poor Internet connection and poor mobile signals.
Auditors must review operational logbooks to determine whether operators of 
smart IDSs keep track of cases of networks failures such as poor Internet connec-
tions, inability to access emails and poor mobile signals in the organization. These 
will give insightful evidence into the effectiveness of Internet and mobile service 
providers that are supporting the organization. The findings in this case may also 
guide the auditor in recommending to the organization to sustain or review the 
Service Level Agreements (SLAs) they agreed with their service providers. The new 
threats to cyber physical resources how to mitigate intrusions that can co-occur 
together without sharing the same impacts on the targets. Outputs of log analyzers 
may indicate graphical illustrations of alerts [8]. Some operators of smart IDSs may 
prefer to adopt visualizations to interpret alerts in the form of histogram, pie charts, 
bar charts and simple correlation graphs [8]. Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate graphi-
cal illustrations of alerts from Snort whenever the valued held in the TCP and TOS 
are used to analyze alerts from the same dataset. For these reasons, IDS audit must 
be able to establish audit issues concerning attributes and metrics the organization 
are adopting to differentiate sequences or patterns of alerts that have tendencies to 
possess different interpretations from alerts that have regular patterns even if these 
alerts are analyzed with different attributes. Some interpretations of alerts may 
not impact directly on business operations that human element of Cyber Physical 
Systems (CPSs) transacts on daily basis. In addition, it is plausible that some intru-
sions are seasonal threats to Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs). Figure 4 illustrates log 
analysis of alerts on the basis of the values held in TCP of intrusive alerts.
Figure 4. 
Log analysis of alerts by values held in TCP of alerts.
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A seasonal rise in successful cases of cyber-attacks on corporate elements of 
Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) can co-occur with a seasonal rise in unemployment 
and suspension of skilled workers. Therefore, IDS audit must establish the avail-
ability of inbuilt functionalities and capability of log analyzers in the organization 
to enable operators of smart IDSs to timely detect and mine frequent alerts from 
multiple sensors. Some IDS auditors can face challenges in recommending simple 
methods for graphical interpretations of IDS logs to organizations that do not 
include methods they prefer to illustrate intrusions against their Cyber Physical 
Systems in their IDS policy. Figure 5 describes log analysis of alerts on the basis of 
the values held in the type of service (TOS) and Protocol of intrusive alerts.
5.  Methodology for auditing smart IDSs and log analyzers in Cyber 
Physical Systems (CPSs)
Log analyzers are defined in this chapter as various programs that are designed 
to analyze logs of IDSs in a corporate setting [8]. Log analyzers have different objec-
tives. The chapter proposes log analyzers that are interfaced with GSM to send short 
text messages after they have processed alerts of smart IDSs to operators. Log ana-
lyzers often have different objectives. For instance, log analyzers can be designed to 
debug NIDSs in the organization. There are log analyzers that determine the degree 
of predictability of attributes and information conveyed by attributes of alerts. 
Similarly, there are log analyzers that focus on correlation and aggregation of alerts. 
Sources of input data to each log analyzers in the same organization may also vary.
Some log analyzers may derive their input data from homogeneous logs of smart 
IDSs while significant numbers of them may receive input data from heterogeneous 
IDSs. By auditing them, operators and IDS auditors will be able to ascertain how 
the existing Log analyzers cluster alerts to arrive at the succinct texts they send to 
operators. For log analyzers that receive input data from several smart IDSs, it is 
necessary for the IS auditors to assess the locations of the contributing IDSs in rela-
tion to the log analyzers that aggregate or analyze their logs. Evaluators should ask 
questions like was the input modules of various log analyzers designed to override 
old alerts or append new alerts to previous ones and what programming language 
Figure 5. 
Log analysis of alerts by values held in TOS and Protocol of alerts.
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was used to design them? The time to upload new alerts to the input modules of 
the log analyzers should also be audited. Figure 6 is a sample of execution of log 
analyzer of alerts that is implemented in this chapter.
The results from the above enquiry can determine log analyzers that should 
be recommended for upgrade and new development that should be incorporated 
to improve intrusion detection in the organization. Figure 6 illustrates samples 
of execution of four categories of log analyzers that are designed to support the 
aruments raised in this chapter. These log analyzers are implemented with C++ 
language and they are based on the attributes of alerts from Snort IDS. The input 
to three of the analyzers were alerts that Snort triggered on the DATA01, DATA02 
and DEFCON-10 dataset in IDS and offline modes. The input to forth analyzer 
was alerts that Snort triggered on DDoS datasets supplied by the DAPRA to assist 
research community. The IDS triggered 4,919 alerts and dropped 250 packets after 
analyzing the packet capture (PCAP) file of the dataset. Typical IDS research can 
explore many concepts with the above alerts.
The first log analyzer explores the rules that triggered the above alerts and a 
sample of its results is shown in Table 3. The second log analyzer explores the 
sources of the intrusions and all the addresses of computers they attacked and cat-
egorize them on the basis of date, time, sequence number, source IP address, source 
port number, destination IP address and port number of destination address. The 
third log analyzer explores the sources and destinations of the intrusions captured 
in the dataset. To ascertain the variability and quality of the alerts, the analyzer 
went further to compute Gini Index on the basis of sources and destnations of the 
attacks to further classify the alerts as shown in Table 1.
Given the probability of each cluster [p(ct)] and for each attribute (SIP or DIP), 
the Gini Index is expressed as [14]:
 
1




GIndex SIP DI p cP
=
= −∑  (1)
The fourth analyzer uses alerts from DATA01 and DATA02 to compute the 
lengths of alerts and the pattern within them.
5.1 A model for auditing smart IDSs and log analyzers in Cyber Physical Systems
The auditors of smart IDSs must have audit plan and feasible audit time table. 
The audit time table should categorically state the annual frequency proposes for 
conducting audit of smart IDSs and log analyzers in the organization [4, 24, 25, 27]. 
Figure 7 describes a model for auditing Smart IDSs and Log analyzers in CPSs.
The audit plans can be an annual arrangement or a short-term plan that itemize 
the procedures the auditors will adopt to conduct IDS audit in the organization at the  
due dates. Figure 7 illustrates the schematic diagram of a new framework for audit-
ing smart Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) and log analyzers in this chapter. 
Accordingly, IDS auditors should preview the entire processes they will follow to 
carry out the audit of smart IDSs and log analyzers in advance. This is called the 
planning phase. This is the stage at which the auditors must delineate the objectives, 
scope, budget and resources they would require to comprehensively accomplish the 
audit [4, 5, 24]. The auditors will also need to establish the methods they will adopt to 
carryout fact-finding; the duration or time frame they will spend on each stage and 
the total time they will generally spend to conduct the review. The IDS audit team 
should categorically state the format of the IDS audit reports, potential challenges 
they envisage and the period they schedule to conduct exit meetings with the man-
agement of smart IDSs in Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs).
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The second stage of this model is the preliminary examination of smart IDSs’ 
controls and Log analyzers. In this stage, the IDS auditors ought to carry out 
initial assessment of the existing IDS resources, all related components of the IDS; 
operational procedures and the controls that were implemented in the enterprise 
to safeguard the smart IDSs and log analyzers. The auditors should interview or 
send questionnaires to main employees that are responsible for the management of 
different smart IDSs and all log analyzers in the organization [17, 18]. The review 
should cover all the IDSs in the organization together with infrastructure in the 
organization that relates to them, logical access and physical security of each smart 
IDS. The directory of each smart IDS, access to the root directory, procedure to log 
on to the root, permissions granted to read, write, execute and modify files and log 
analyzers; operating systems; hardware requirements including security, usage and 
available disk space; configuration files (signatures, profiles, etc) and respective 
logs kept by each smart IDS and log analyzer must be requested from the dedicated 
IDS operators. The review of the log analyzers and other programs that interface 
with the logs of the smart IDS should also be carried out at this stage using simu-
lated attacks.
Furthermore, at the third stage of this model, the IDS auditors begin to critically 
examine Service Level Agreement (SLA) on the smart IDSs and verify the SLA for 
Figure 6. 
A sample of execution of log analyzer of alerts.
Dataset Attribute Number of cluster Gini Index
DDOS-1-SIP Source IP 408 0.998
DDOS-1-DIP Destination IP 1 0.000
DDOS-2-SIP Source IP 265 0.996
DDOS-2-DIP Destination IP 1 0.000
Table 1. 
Log analysis of online trace files.
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proprietary log analyzers [18]. They will scrutinize process flow, incident reporting 
procedures; relevant features of physical and organizational structures; training 
and users manuals in the organization that is using Cyber Physical System to sup-
port their business operations. They must test and validate the level of security and 
controls that have been implemented to counter likely threats and attacks on smart 
IDSs and related infrastructure in the networks [7, 13, 25]. Auditors must examine 
the seamless of the entire components of the engineered systems and quantify 
the level of protection smart IDSs in the organization can render to them. They 
must review controls and configurations of operating systems, security of smart 
IDSs and database access controls. The review at this stage should include various 
strategies the organization has implemented to hardening the host computer(s) and 
the networks so that auditors can establish the levels of compliance of operations of 
smart IDSs in the company with best practices [5, 21, 25].
In the fourth stage, proper documentation and reporting are critical elements 
that auditors must carryout to achieve comprehensive auditing of smart IDSs and 
log analyzers [4, 18, 25]. Hence, it is imperative for the IDS auditors to docu-
ment key findings they observe at each stage of the audit. This chapter proposes 
that the IDS auditors should appoint dedicated scribers among the audit team to 
document tests and respective findings as the audit progresses. IDS audit reports 
should include executive summary, suitable headings, controls investigated 
during the audit and corresponding findings the team of auditors have observed 
in the organization [17, 24]. They must include remarks, recommendations and 
practical suggestions on how IDS operators and designers of existing log ana-
lyzer can fix audit issues they have identified in the review. Thus, this chapter 
proposes that documentation and reporting of findings should be incorporated 
into stage 4 of a comprehensive audit of smart IDSs and Log analyzers in Cyber 
Physical System.
Figure 7. 
A model for auditing smart IDSs and log analyzers in CPSs.
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Exit meeting is the fifth stage for a comprehensive audit of smart IDS and log 
analyzers in the context of Cyber Physical Systems. The auditors and audit team 
from the organization that is under review must gather together in interactive 
conferencing to discuss the audit reports before the audit team will exit the orga-
nization [17, 25]. The meetings are avenues for both teams to agree on the date and 
how various audit issues raised on the smart IDSs, log analyzers; computational and 
cyber physical infrastructure in the organization will be fixed. The meetings should 
state the date the representatives of audit team will revisit the unit of the organiza-
tion to check that issues raised in the IDS audit reports have been fixed.
Finally, follow-up is the sixth and last stage of the above framework. The 
representatives of the IDS audit team must revisit the organization to examine 
documents like visitor’s diary and access log to the above resources. They need to 
also report on the status of all the issues that have been raised in the audit reports 
they recently submitted to the organization [25]. To conclude the audit, the reports 
of this team should categorically state audit issues on smart IDSs and log analyzers 
that have been fixed, pending issues and reasons behind the delay on audit issues 
that end-users have not fixed. We suggest that auditors must advise the organization 
to develop a suitable IDS policy whenever they have none.
5.2 Results and discussions
The attacks illustrated with the DDOS-1 and DDOS-2 datasets in Table 1 did 
not vary on the basis of their respective destinations’ IP addresses when compared 
with the sources’ IP addresses of the attacks. The results sugest that the entire alerts 
that originate from the dataset are mostly repeated information that belongs to one 
group of destination’s IP address. Hence, the Gini Index was 0.000.
Figure 8 illustrates log analysis of lengths of alerts in DATA01 dataset.
Therefore, IDS auditors must as well audit codes and Log analyzers to establish 
the input data, their functions and capabilities in other to establish the strenghts 
and limitations of each analyzer. Such systematic review will enable the auditor to 
establish Log analyzers that analysts should optimize either by splitting them or by 
merging two or more codes together. Table 2 illustrates cumulative length of attri-
butes that Snort has used to report 4919 and 75,390 alerts on DATA01 and DATA02 
respectively. Table 3 interprets the attacks from the above evaluation and the rules 
that detected them. Thus, auditors can adopt information in Tables 2 and 3 to 
conduct risk assessments and identify strategies of some intruders in Cyber Physical 
Systems (CPSs).
Figure 9 is a description of log analysis of lengths of alerts in DATA02 dataset.
Essentially, Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the patterns that lengths of alerts from 
both datasets can generate. Thus, the chance that intruders can overload smart IDSs 
over time depends on the quantity of alerts the detectors can trigger on daily basis. 
The results further suggest that automated strategy for forecasting length of alerts 
smart IDSs generate is critical to auditors in conducting audit of smart IDSs in the 
context of Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs). This can assist operators to forecast pat-
terns of attacks, workload and how human aspects of security and privacy can link 
to Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs).
5.3 Suggestions for improving security in Cyber Physical Systems
The above models have practical implementations in protecting computational, 
human, mechanical and physical components that are fundamental to Cyber 
Physical Systems (CPSs). IDS policy must state the configurations and various types 
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of smart IDSs in the above settings. This document should state the vendors of 
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDs) and Host-based Intrusion Detection 
Systems (HIDSs) installed to safeguard all entities in Cyber Physical Systems 
(CPSs). Auditors must verify whether the policy approves software-based IDSSs or 
hardware-based IDSs, or combinations of both detectors. Among other things, audi-
tors should further investigate this document to ascertain if it contains information 
regarding license fees, number of users, expiration date for the payment of license 
fees and bank accounts of the vendors of smart IDSs procured in these settings.
IDS policy must reflect operators of smart IDSs responsible for the administra-
tion and monitoring of various smart IDSs and Log analyzers in the organiza-
tion. Recently, intruders keenly probe source codes to establish their limitations. 
Therefore, it is imperative for IDS auditors to carefully scrutinize IDS policy. The 
document must categorically state allowable length of time to train supervised 
learning algorithms as well as the acceptable level that log analyzers must reduce 
workload due to IDS alerts in other to undermine the generality of intrusions IDSs 
have warned. What is the acceptable way to classify similar alerts and similar intru-
sions? Should similar intrusions be classified on the basis of temporal relationships, 
intrusive objectives, capabilities to support subsequent intrusions or values held in 
the attributes of alerts? The audit must be able to match IDS policy with the above 
questions for the document to be useful for mitigating problems of alert correla-
tions that have raised serious concerns among security experts in recent time. IDS 
policy document should not reflect ambiguity in any aspect. The document should 
be simple and explicit. It should also include the incident and reporting team; 
processes of escalating cases of intrusions and response strategy approved by the 




Log analysis of components of alerts.
Figure 8. 
Log analysis of lengths of alerts (DATA01).
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management. In all, it is equally suggested that IDS policy should include methods 
for handling public awareness and lessons learnt in the case of devastated attacks 
that require the organization to intimate the general public.
Sig_generator Sig_id Sig_rev Description of 
alert/attack
Summary of attack
119 2 1 Double decoding 
attack
The attack was an http exploit. 
The intuder inllegally inspected 
HyperText Transfer Protocol 
(http) to gather information 
about application protocol for 
distributing hypermedia data in the 
networks
119 18 1 Webroot 
directory 
traversal
The attack was an http exploit. The 
intuder possibly accessed data, 
codes, files, etc via root directory of 
the web server in the networks
122 1 0 TCP portscan The intuder inllegally scanned a 
computer port with intention to 
gather information about open 
ports, close ports and services 
running in the computer
125 2 1 Invalid FTP 
command
The intuder used invalid FTP 
command to possibly transfer files 
in the networks
125 3 1 FTP command 
parameters were 
too long
The attack was buffer overflow 
exploits with FTP client. The 
intruder used telnet’s client to 
possibly transfer files that exceeded 
maximum length in the networks
125 4 1 FTP command 
parameters were 
malformed
The intruder used badly formed 
FTP command to possibly transfer 
files on FTP client
Table 3. 
Log analysis of rules that generate alerts.
Figure 9. 
Log analysis of lengths of alerts (DATA02).
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An organization may deploy smart IDSs that run on different operating systems. 
The performance of smart IDSs becomes necessary whenever they run on differ-
ent operating systems. For instance, experience shows that Bro usually operates in 
Linux/Unix, FreeBSD and Solaris’ environment while Snort can run with Windows 
and Unix/Linux operating systems. There are different ways to hardening differ-
ent operating systems. Therefore, auditors must familiar with different ways to 
hardening common operating systems in the industry. Some smart IDSs require 
installations of client software on computers in the networks of Cyber Physical 
Systems (CPSs). Hence, auditors must also ensure they audit client software on 
computers in the networks that interface with smart IDSs. Uninteresting activities 
and activities that are important attacks can vary from organization to organiza-
tion. Hence, auditors must be professional at all time. They should professionally 
handle recommendations aiming to limit the number of false positives especially 
while suggesting extra policy scripts that should be included with existing rules for 
detecting cyber-attacks.
Some toolkits can express their signatures as regular expressions or as fixed 
strings. Audit of smart IDSs in Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) should establish 
how signatures are designed in each detector. This information is needed in recom-
mending suitable training and professional development to operators of smart IDSs 
whenever audit reports suggest that operators lack sufficient knowledge to carry 
out their daily jobs’ specifications. Auditors of smart IDSs and log analyzers should 
evaluate the effectiveness of training facilities that are available for conducting in-
house training in the organization. In-house training can be recommended to opera-
tors in case the required facilitators are available in the organization. It is ethical for 
auditors to recommend training outside the organization to operators of smart IDSs 
whenever there are insufficient facilities to conduct in-house training in the organi-
zation [25, 27]. Operational training should include topics such as network or traffic 
content, false positives. false negatives, policy scripting or writing rules or signature, 
signature-matching, uninteresting activities, interesting activities, cyber threats and 
attacks, security, user privileges, front-end and back-end of smart IDSs; installa-
tion, configuration, maintenance and execution of smart IDSs and log analyzers to 
empower operators of smart IDSs in Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs). Auditors should 
ascertain operators if smart IDSs that aware or unaware of the official websites of 
various smart IDSs in the organization during audit of smart IDSs and log analyzers. 
The audit should establish operators of smart IDSs that subscribe or unsubscribe to 
news update in the official websites of IDSs in the organization. The reason is that 
official websites of IDSs often contain helpful documentations and new tips about 
bugs and attacks and strategies to fix them. There should be no bandwidth limitations 
in the networks for most smart IDSs to be effective. Organizations should strictly 
adhere to the hardware requirements such as hard disk and processor of host comput-
ers; software requirement such as operating systems (Linux, Windows and Solaris) 
and the required versions of auxiliary tools such as libpcap, Perl and tcpdump that 
service providers recommend for smart IDSs to ensure high performance. Audit 
reports should state the location of smart IDSs in the organization; other options for 
location the toolkits and their respective benefits to enlighten the organization. For 
instance, smart IDSs can be installed behind an external firewall in the networks. 
This will enable the firewall to reduce numbers of suspicious packets that smart IDSs 
in CPSs will analyze. Some organizations may install smart IDSs before the external 
firewall. This method will enable smart IDSs to detect potential attacks migrating 
into the networks. The trade-offs is that smart IDSs will produce high number of 
alerts for log analyzers and operators to analyze. Smart IDSs can also be installed 
inside internal firewall if the human element in Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) aims 
to detect internal hosts that are vulnerable to computer worms and computer virus.
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Audit reports should specify agencies that require external reports of incidents 
from the organization that is being audited. Statistics on incident information 
can suggest prevalence of security breaches of Cyber Physical systems (CPSs) 
nationwide. Auditors can evaluate compliance of the organization to the various 
requirements of regulatory bodies by reviewing information about the frequency 
regulators required for submitting mandatory reports to the government and 
National Agency for Incident Analysis (NAIA). The formats of the reports may be 
summary of critical incidents or all cases of security violations on monthly, quar-
terly, biannual or annual basis. Interview with someone who inspects and forwards 
the reports to the required external recipients will appropriately establish details of 
how and when the reports are due for submission. The reports to agencies should 
be informative in case they require the reports in specific formats. Operators should 
express the date and time the incident begin and end. The number of each type of 
incident could be included in the report period for statistical purpose.
Smart IDSs and log analyzers merely detect suspicious events. They cannot make 
authoritative decisions if a suspicious event is an attack or not attack. These mecha-
nisms also lack the intelligence to decide whether an attack is successful attack or 
a failed or unsuccessful attack. Therefore, operators and recipients of alerts from 
smart IDSs and log analyzers must constantly investigate the reports they receive 
from the above mechanisms. Furthermore, IDS audit reports and reports on log 
analyzers should be simultaneously made available to the IDS operators in the 
organizations to address all audit issues pinpointed in the reports.
Above all, the above audit model is an integral part of the information security 
of an organization. Host machines, hardware-based IDSs and repository for storing 
reports on smart IDSs should be regularly protected from intruders like burglars. 
For software-based IDSs, the logical security of databases of the IDSs; web servers 
and various infrastructural components on the networks such as router, firewall 
and location of the smart IDSs in relation to the firewall should be thoroughly 
reviewed to ascertain their levels of compliance with best security standards. 
Segregation of duties among network engineers, Database Administrators (DBAs), 
internal control and operators of smart IDSs in Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) is 
highly recommended. It is disastrous if the logs are deleted while the toolkit is run-
ning. Auditors should recommend enforcement of strong access controls to restrict 
illegal logging in to the configurations and logs of smart IDSs as panacea to infor-
mation leakages and attacks on smart IDS through the back-end of applications in 
Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) [12].
The root causes of intrusions are dynamic security and privacy issues in Cyber 
Physical Systems (CPSs). Broad audit should be able to reveal how log analyzers 
adopt classification rules to segment logs of smart IDSs in Cyber Physical Systems 
(CPSs) and classify alerts into normal and abnormal events. Without sound under-
standing of data mining procedures, IDS auditors might face difficult challenges to 
audit association and episode rules necessary to expose hidden relationship among 
alerts that are not obviously related. Research has discovered that sequence of the 
intrusions on cyber physical resources in an organization can occur within differ-
ent timestamp. Practically, it is difficult to find the mean of categorical datasets 
that have no numerical attributes. Instances whereby the designers of log analyzers 
have adopted weighted values to transform alerts in the logs of smart IDSs must 
be clearly reviewed during audit. The reports will enable end users to establish 
limitations of algorithms that adopt concepts like k-nearest-neighbor (KNN) 
classifiers and how to improve on the underpinning concepts for transposing alerts 
into human readable form in the organization. Auditors should establish types of 
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) and other threat solutions in 
Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs).
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The above results submit that auditors must audit log analyzers irrespective of 
whether they are locally designed or they are proprietary models in the organiza-
tion. The reports should reveal expert rules that are used to process events’ logs and 
their characteristics. Auditors should strongly recommend proper documentations 
for log analyzers and other threat solutions in Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs). 
Essentially, the above audit model should establish the existence or absence of audit 
team in the organization. Reports obtained from the audit should be submitted 
to the unit in charge of monitoring smart IDSs in the organization. Thereafter, 
auditors should notify them and management with written reports stating past 
audit issues that have been suitably addressed [16, 26]. Otherwise, a terminal date 
to ensure that all pending audit issues must be addressed and potential impacts of 
noncompliance must be issued to the above stakeholders as well.
6. Conclusion
This chapter shows that pragmatic studies on audit of smart IDSs in the context 
of Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) are erroneously taken lightly over the years. This 
gap has generated negative impacts in the security of computational components, 
cyber and physical resources of Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) over the years. 
Manufacturers of smart IDSs can design rules or policies that are deactivated by 
default because they are not immediately needed to protect Cyber Physical Systems 
(CPSs). Such rules or policies can be completely useless if smart IDSs are not peri-
odically audited. Operators can waste huge resources to redesign inactive rules or 
policies due to lack of information about possible threats and cyber attacks in Cyber 
Physical Systems (CPSs) and ignorance of the existence of similar rules or policies 
in the detection engines of smart IDSs. Consequently, the chapter demonstrates 
that log analyzers can serve diverse objectives in a corporate setting. It has also been 
stated that series of intrusions can elude smart IDSs whenever the periodic audit 
of smart IDSs in Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) is not based on empirical findings. 
The idea is that smart IDSs and all log analyzers in a corporate setting must be spe-
cially audited and their readiness for packets processing must be routinely verified 
to ascertain their compliance with best security practices.
There are several concerns that may arise if the computers hosting smart IDSs 
are weakly protected or if they are not protected at all. The toolkit can be compro-
mised by intruders, thereby under-reporting or over-reporting security breaches 
in Cyber Physical Systems in the organization. Intrusions that overpower hosts of 
smart IDSs can suddenly shutdown the toolkits without the awareness of opera-
tors. The smart IDSs can begin to generate series of false alerts. These devices can 
suddenly stop to trigger alerts if intruders cleverly re-configure them without the 
awareness of dedicated employees. Experienced intruders may modify rules or poli-
cies of smart IDSs and compromise the passwords for logging to the root directories 
of smart IDSs in Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs). They may delete logs, modify 
alerts and other related components of these toolkits. Some intruders may disable 
smart IDSs in Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) before they will attacks the networks. 
The integrity of the log analyzers that analyze logs of compromised smart IDSs in 
these circumstances will also be subjective. Therefore, smart IDSs and log analyzers 
in Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) must be periodically audited to establish lapses 
or hidden faults in the validity and the strength of the protection that the internal 
controls offered to the detectors and to help the company to settle on the cost of 
ownership of their smart IDSs.
This chapter has proposed an audit model that should contain significant and 
explicit information necessary to guide human elements in Cyber Physical Systems 
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(CPSs). The chapter also substantiates the importance of smart log analyzers in 
the security of Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs). These groups of log analyzers are 
configured to remotely send brief statements that present the main points about 
alerts/attacks and in the form of short text messages to the operators of smart IDSs 
in Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs). The message may include “source IP, destina-
tion IP, short descriptions and time of occurrence of the attacks”. The above model 
has also suggested that audit reports should contain executive summary on audit 
of smart IDSs and log analyzers in Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs); objectives or 
purpose and scope of the audit. The reports must also include all proprietary and 
locally developed log analyzers that relate to smart IDSs in the review. The reports 
will be informative if they convey information about the available resources, 
challenges and date of the audit. Columns that outline the serial number (S/N); 
control tests that auditors have carried out, findings, risk assessment of each 
problem, suggestions that can mitigate the problems; human elements in Cyber 
Physical Systems (CPSs) that should fix the problems and remarks or explicit 
comments (that will state whether the problem has been fixed or is still a pending 
issue) should be incorporated in the audit reports. Useful explanations regarding 
the entire phases of the audit, signatories to the reports and annotations should 
be included in the reports to clarify and substantiate the validity of the reports to 
stakeholders in Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs).
Furthermore, auditors must periodically verify that logs of smart IDSs and log 
analyzers in Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) are regularly archived and operators 
strictly adhere to the modality for maintaining them. This chapter has further pro-
vided a new pathway on how to investigate the sufficiency of IDSs intelligence and 
log analyzers and the degree at which they conform to IDS policy and best security 
practices in a real-life environment and in the context of Cyber Physical Systems 
(CPSs). Since empirical studies have shown that IDS policy is a well-established fact 
in IDS manuals, similarly, future studies should provide best standards and frame-
works for concurrent auditing of smart IDSs and log analyzers in Cyber Physical 
Systems (CPSs) using non-statistical metrics. Finally, strong cooperation between 
organizations, GSM operators and research community can help to lessen issues 
and challenges in Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) that have been identified in this 
chapter.
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